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“All things that are in time have a ‘Why?’. Ask a man why he eats: ‘For strength’. – 
‘Why do you sleep?’ – ‘For the same reason’. And so on with all things that are in time.  
But if you should ask a good man, ‘Why do you love God?’ – ‘I don’t know – for God’s 
sake’. – ‘Why do you love truth?’ – ‘For truth’s sake’. – Why do you love righteousness?’ 
– ‘For righteousness’ sake’. ‘Why do you live?’ – ‘Indeed I don’t know – I like living!’”    
- Meister Eckhart 
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ABSTRACT 
 I trace the concept of nothingness in twentieth century philosophical theology 
from the work Paull Tillich through that of Martin Heidegger and Keiji Nishitani toward 
Robert Neville and Ray L. Hart all of whom have taken up the challenge of nothingness. 
As a specific metaphysical concept or category, these philosophers and theologians 
would undoubtedly disagree on a specific definition of nothingness; however, I argue 
they would agree on the vague function of nothingness, which is a relief or contrast to 
being.  Tied up with existence contra nothingness are the possibilities of existence or 
meontic nothingness. At stake in the encounter with or exposure to nothingness is the 
ability to refund or redeem one’s ownmost potential and possibilities. How one responds 
to the specter of nothingness makes nothing matter (or not) in the way one turns from 
nothingness back to existence. In other words, the stakes are not merely the metaphysical 
(non)status of nothingness, but the desire to find meaning and value in human, finite 
existence in the face of radical contingency and the specter of nihilism.  
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PREFACE 
Nothing matters if anything is to matter at all.  But what is nothing and in what 
sense does it matter?  Nothingness is a vague metaphysical category usually described in 
terms of what it is not namely being.  Cast in this apophatic light, nothingness exists (if it 
can be said to exist at all and which at the very least it can be said) at the boundaries of 
human language and thought.    From the musings of the pre-Socratics, to Plato, the Neo-
Platonists, the thinkers within the Christian tradition of creatio ex nihilo, and modern 
philosophical theologians such as Paul Tillich and Robert Neville, to existentialist 
philosophers like Martin Heidegger and Keiji Nishitani, and death of God theologians 
such as Ray Hart, nothingness in its various forms has played a pivotal role in the 
systematic valuing of being and finite existence.  As a specific metaphysical concept or 
category, these philosophers and theologians would no doubt disagree on the definition of 
nothingness.  I argue they do agree on the vague function of nothingness: a relief or 
contrast to being.  One exists on the pain of being nothing at all.  In this sense, 
nothingness plays a crucial role in what Robert Neville has called a finite/infinite 
contrast.  While what exactly each specific form of nothingness is and means may differ, 
nothingness matters for the contrast.  As an integral part of the finite/infinite contrast, 
nothingness is a viable comparative religious (philosophical-theological) category.  It is 
both vague enough to be used in multiple religious settings and specific enough to add 
value for individual systems of thought.   
In the following, I closely trace a small strand of mid twentieth century Protestant, 
Western philosophical theologians’ historical interpretations of being and nothingness in 
  ix 
order to discover a philology or genealogy of nothingness.  Paul Tillich sets the stage for 
an investigation into nothingness with his ground of being theology and its relation to ouk 
on and me on, two variations on nothingness, from the first volume of his systematic 
theology.
1
  Working in the wake of Tillich, Ray Hart and Robert Neville both ask a 
profound question. Why is there something rather than nothing?  Each returns a 
drastically different answer, but with some familial similarities, namely their 
indebtedness to Tillich as well as a heterodox appreciation of mystical theology.  
Neville’s work, most recently encapsulated in his three volume philosophical theology, is 
the product of a lifetime of systematic thought.
2
  Absolute nothingness has been on the 
periphery of his work, always remaining on the infinite side of Neville’s this-world focus 
on determinateness.  Hart’s work, which recently came to culmination with the 
forthcoming publication of God Being Nothing, developed an approach to nothingness in 
dialogue with the German mystic Meister Eckhart’s notion of the Godhead, the God 
beyond God who is everything and nothing.
3
  Neville and Hart have not worked in a 
vacuum.  They rely on and dialogue with many modern and post-modern philosophers 
and theologians, many of whom wrestle with the entangled legacy of Martin Heidegger 
and his interpreters such as Keiji Nishitani.  Heidegger famously enlivened the debate 
over Being, questioning the means by which one knows being at all particularly through 
                                                        
1
 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). 
2
 Robert Cummings Neville, Ultimates: Philosophical Theology Volume 1 (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2013). 
3
 Ray L. Hart, God Being Nothing: Toward a Theogony, Religion and Postmodernism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, forthcoming). 
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his analysis of being and death.
4
  Nishitani brings Zen Buddhism and the notion of 
sunyata into dialogue with Heidegger and Christian mystical theology in his work 
Religion and Nothingness.
5
  Key to Nishitani’s endeavor is the status of nothingness in 
the work of Meister Eckhart.   
Given this existentialist bent toward nothingness I am working broadly within the 
field of philosophy of religion, or what Wesley Wildman calls religious philosophy, 
specifically in a hermeneutical niche following after Heidegger’s analysis of being and 
death.
6
  In order to extract competing definitions of nothingness, I closely read and then 
read against several philosophers and theologians.  This interpretative and comparative 
work leads toward the formation of a hypothesis for further refinement.  In this sense, I 
am gesturing toward a possible valuation of nothingness and a refunding of potential for 
human existence.  In many ways, my project is similar to the Comparative Religious 
Ideas Project, notably their volume on ultimate realities, which sought to balance the 
broad strokes of defining ultimate reality by the comparative generalists with tradition 
specific expositions often in tension with one another.
7
  Rather than searching for a vague 
concept of ultimate reality, I explore the underside of ultimacy: nothingness.   This 
                                                        
4
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962). 
5
 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
6
 Wesley J. Wildman, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry : 
Envisioning a Future for the Philosophy of Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2010). 
7
 Robert Cummings Neville, ed., Ultimate Realities: A Volume in the Comparative Religious Ideas 
Project, 1st ed., vol. 2, 3 vols., The Comparative Religious Ideas Project (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 2001). 
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process begins with a close reading of each instantiation of nothingness.  Finally, I 
construct a hypothesis of nothingness as a vague concept that when grasped enlivens 
one’s one existence and refunds one’s potential to be in this world.  
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PAUL TILLICH: OUK ON AND ME ON 
Where to begin an investigation into nothingness?  Nothingness is an ancient 
philosophical concept with roots in most if not all major world religions.  To limit my 
approach or sketch of nothingness into something manageable, it may help to start with a 
common denominator among the various philosophers and theologians at work in the 
genealogical tree of nothingness.  The few thinkers under my microscope represent one 
branch or offshoot of nothingness that casts the ontological structure of existence in relief 
to nothingness.  One could easily identify the beginning of this offshoot with Plato’s 
Sophist, a hugely influential text on the nature of being and non-being or nothingness.  
Such a beginning would be too broad.  Who has not been influenced by Plato?  Another 
beginning might be Meister Eckhart who radicalized nothingness and God into the 
Godhead.  Eckhart brings to the fore the stakes at risk for nothingness and existence in 
his search to find an answer for his question: Why does the just man live?  Eckhart serves 
as an important touchstone but lacks systematic clarity in his musings on nothingness.  In 
addition, the ontological categories Eckhart employs while fundamental for the growth of 
existential philosophy and theology in the twentieth century lack the existentialists’ 
timbre, particularly the anxiety or angst of the moderns.  Paul Tillich, in contrast, marks 
the emergence of being and nothingness as foundational concepts for modern life.  He 
dialogues with the existential philosophers and sets the stage for later philosophical 
theologians to re-interpret nothingness.  Volume 1 of Tillich’s three part Systematic 
Theology provides a striking springboard for an investigation into nothingness, offering 
an initial hermeneutic to understand nothingness in two distinct ways: ouk on and me on: 
  
2 
The mystery of nonbeing demands a dialectical approach.  The genius of 
the Greek language has provided a possibility of distinguishing the 
dialectical concept of nonbeing from the nondialectical by call the first me 
on and the second ouk on.  Ouk on is the “nothing” which has no relation 
at all to being; me on is the “nothing” which has a dialectical relation to 
being.
8
 
The first thing to note about Tillich’s division of nothingness is the Greek 
grammatical structure of nothing.  Each is the negation of on or being.  In this sense, a 
more literal rendering of ouk on and me on generally is nonbeing.  Ouk and Me 
emphasize negation differently.  Ouk is the negation of something factual, contradicting 
or denying a statement of fact.  Me negates will or thought, rejecting or deprecating 
something thought or willed.
9
  John Christopherson characterizes ouk and me for Tillich 
as Nichts and Nichtsein respectively, emphasizing the existential relevance for each.
10
 
Ouk or Nichts, German for nothing, has a negative relation to being.  Me or Nichtsein, 
German for nonbeing, refers to a more expansive and mystical notion of nonbeing.  In 
other words, ouk when applied to being is the absolute negation of being or absolute 
nothingness.  It does not exist.  It is a negative nothing.  Me negates being in another 
sense of nonbeing as the negation of one’s possibility or potential to be.  It is a positive or 
productive nothing. 
                                                        
8
 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:187–8. 
9
 “Herbert Weir Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges, Part IV: Syntax, NEGATIVE 
SENTENCES,” accessed November 27, 2015, 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0007:part=4:chapter=59. 
10
 John Christopherson, “The Concept of Non-Being and Its Role in Paul Tillich’s Thought” (PhD 
diss., University of Chicago, 1995), 48. 
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The second thing to note about Tillich’s use of nonbeing is his emphasis upon the 
dialectical nature of me on in contrast to the nondialectical nature of ouk on.  Tillich’s 
dialectical appropriation of nonbeing drives to the heart of his encounter with 
nothingness, namely the ontological shock of the possibility of the negation of being.  
The human is in a unique position in which one can imagine oneself no longer being and 
simultaneously question what it means to be.  By raising the specter of nonbeing, 
humanity participates in both being and nonbeing.  This paradoxical participation in both 
being and nonbeing is part of the odd ontological structure of nonbeing which does not 
exist except in the projection of nonbeing out of being and vice versa.  If being and 
nothing are contradictory opposites, no understanding of the world or humanity’s own 
being is possible.  If being and nothing are in a dialectical or polar tension, one can grasp 
the world and humanity’s place in it.  In this sense, the dialectical nature of being and 
nothingness allows and resolves the tension of thinking nonbeing.  Tillich’s invocation of 
dialectical thinking is a direct reference to Hegel’s dialectical logic and an attempt to 
overthrow ossified concepts of ontology.
11
  One moves from being through its negation to 
a final affirmation of the depths of being.
12
   
Tillich embeds his renderings of ouk on and me on as part of his analysis of the 
human existential situation.  This existential situation is one of ontological or 
metaphysical shock, which Tillich describes with a question: “Why is there something; 
                                                        
11
 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:56. 
12
 Ibid., 1:101. 
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why not nothing?”13  Tillich attempts to answer this question with an analysis of being, 
following in the footsteps of Heidegger and the existentialists with ontology and first 
philosophy while extending their insights into the realm of theology.  He extends the 
philosophical analysis of being, the questioning of being, into the questioning of God, 
which is implied in the concept of being, through the concept of finitude.
14
  Finitude is 
the key to unlock Tillich’s analysis of being.  Beginning from the uniquely human 
awareness of a being who participates in Being, one knows that one exists, Tillich presses 
against the limits of human awareness and existence with finitude, the knowledge that 
one will die and no longer be.  Finitude is the edge of being and nonbeing.  It is the site of 
definitive existence, to be a thing, this thing not that thing, rather than nothing at all.  It is 
also the starting point for angst or anxiety, which is the threat of nonbeing inherent in 
finitude.  Latent within the self-awareness of finitude and anxiety is acknowledgement of 
the contingent nature of one’s existence.   This raises a series of unanswerable questions 
that lead toward nihilism: “He might not be!  Then why is he?  And why should he 
continue to be?”15  The human existential situation is a self-awareness of one’s finitude 
and eventual death that pushes one toward anxiety.  One can answer this anxiety with the 
courage to be, to be here and now, to be finite.  One’s search for the courage to be drives 
one to the question of God, being-itself, and the unity of being and nonbeing.  In other 
                                                        
13
 Ibid., 1:163. 
14
 Ibid., 1:166. 
15
 Ibid., 1:196. 
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words, one searches for God to quell the anxiety of being finite, to ground the insecurity 
of finitude.  The existential analysis sends one to the theological analysis.   
Nothingness or nonbeing matters for Tillich for the tenor it gives to finite 
existence.  Nonbeing is the limit of finitude – to no longer be a thing but to be nothing; 
one goes toward one’s death; to end.  The specter of nothingness at the edge of finite 
existence provides an existential and emotional anxiety to one’s life.  How can one live 
and value one’s existence?  This is in part the search for ultimate concern, the search for 
one’s being and meaning.16  In this sense, nothingness is the spur toward ultimate 
concern.   
The existential stakes for nothingness are high.  Nothingness matters so that 
everything might matter.  Nothing also matters for Tillich’s ontology.  Ontologically, 
nonbeing is the limit of finite existence.  One exists as a finite thing in a process of 
becoming.  Once one realizes the limits of finitude, one can begin to understand the 
broader ontological structure of Being and of nothingness or nonbeing.  Several 
ontological categories undergird Tillich’s analysis of finitude and ultimate concern: Finite 
being or becoming, Being-itself or the depths of being, Ouk on, nondialectical or absolute 
nonbeing, and Me on, dialectical nonbeing or possible being.   
The starting point for an analysis of being is that being for which being is up for 
grabs – namely the human who is aware of her own being.  Tillich follows Martin 
Heidegger’s footsteps into this initial analysis of being.17  Tillich’s appropriation of 
                                                        
16
 Ibid., 1:14. 
17
 Ibid., 1:168. 
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Heidegger’s hermeneutical analysis of Dasein is a beautiful rendition, passing over the 
clunkiness of Heidegger’s made-up German phrases in order to parse the theological 
significance of existential ontology.  A critical aspect of this initial analysis is the role of 
reason in humanity’s self-understanding of one’s own being.  Reason or logos provides 
the structure with which to grasp the whole self-world and self-being-nonbeing structure 
of existence.  Logos separates being from the possibility of being, which Tillich 
designates as the me on: “Without reason, without the logos of being, being would be 
chaos, that is, it would not be being but only the possibility of it (me on).  But where there 
is reason there are a self and a world in interdependence.”18  Logos provides a structure 
and reality to being which would otherwise be chaos or me on.  This structure of being 
that logos provides is the limit or definition of being a finite thing, to be a specific thing 
that has a form.  Logos gives shape to the particular form of being a human, one who 
understands and questions one’s own being.  Inherent to the structure of being is the 
tension between form and dymanics.  The human holds form and dynamics together, 
being something concrete and the possibility of what one might become.  This tension of 
what one is and what one may be is the process of becoming.  The specific, definite, or 
finite being of the human structured by logos and bounded by possibility or me on exists 
in the dynamic tension of becoming.   
The being of humanity is embedded in the dynamics and possible nonbeing of me 
on and the form of the logos of being.  In other words, when one asks the question of 
being – what does it mean to be – one is already enmeshed in being and nonbeing.  One 
                                                        
18
 Ibid., 1:172. 
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finds oneself in a hermeneutic circle where finite being exists on a continuum of being, 
becoming, and nonbeing.  One finds the yes! of finite being in conjunction with the no! of 
nonbeing.  This yes and no process arises out of humanity’s querying of being.  Tillich 
describes this process: “The answer is that man, who is this being, must be separated 
from his being in a way which enables him to look at it as something strange and 
questionable.  And such a separation is actual because man participates not only in being 
but also nonbeing.”  Finite being and nonbeing are part of the polar dynamics of Tillich’s 
dialectical approach.  Humanity participates in nonbeing as humanity participates in 
being.   
What is the being of nonbeing?  In what sense does nonbeing participate in being?  
Remember Tillich’s distinction between ouk on and me on.  Ouk on has no participation 
in being.  It is an absolute nonbeing or nothingness.  It is a nondialectical nonbeing.  Me 
on in contrast is the dialectical nonbeing that participates in being.  Tillich likens me on 
to the chaos of potential being as well as the potential to no longer be.  Me on is the nay 
saying of finite being.  Dialectical nonbeing bounds finite being, driving one toward 
anxiety and the search for ultimate concern and being itself.  At stake in the encounter 
with dialectical nonbeing is the death of oneself.
19
  Eventually this finite thing will die – 
will end and no longer be.  Yet, something remains.  That something that remains is 
being or being itself but is no longer one’s specific, finite being.  Being has the power to 
resist nonbeing.  Being-itself is no longer a specific being but has transcended finite 
being and nonbeing.  Being-itself is God or the ground of being.   
                                                        
19
 Ibid., 1:197. 
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What is the payoff of nonbeing for Tillich?  Why does meontic nonbeing matter 
for humanity and why does oukontic nonbeing matter for God?  It has to do with 
creativity.  God has absolute creativity, creating something out of absolute nothing or ouk 
on.  Human creativity, working from humanity’ finitude, works out of the possibility of 
meontic nonbeing.  Tillich sketches some initial thoughts on human creativity and the 
possibilities of meontic nonbeing for it, but moves quickly to the question of God and 
God’s creativity.  What matters for Tillich the theologian is God, the ground of being, 
which is the source of ultimate concern.  On the human side of being, i.e. finitude, one is 
stuck between the poles of freedom and destiny as well as the finite split between essence 
and existence.  The being of God empowers the finite being of humanity to resist 
nonbeing.  There is no separation of essence and existence for God, who creates the 
world out of nothing – creatio ex nihilo.  God creates out of nothing, i.e. not out of a 
dualistic competing power.  It may be better to say that God creates out of absolute 
nothingness or from nothing, i.e. God creates without recourse to another source beyond 
God.  God creates out of the ground of being, i.e. out of God’s self, giving to God’s 
creatures the power to be.  Tillich describes creaturliness, saying: “It [creaturliness] 
carries in itself the power of being, and this power of being is its participation in being-
itself, in the creative ground of being.”20 This creative power of God is rooted in the 
nature of God as being-itself and the unity of essence and existence as well as the unity of 
potentiality and actuality.   God’s creativity is absolute thus God is symbolically the 
Living God, combining both potency and form.  Acknowledging the symbolic nature of 
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 Ibid., 1:253. 
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God’s ontological structure is crucial, asserts Tillich, to prevent one from wrongly 
attributing an ontological structure of becoming to God.  Becoming implies nothingness 
and would diminish being-itself and the divinity of God.  But symbolically understood 
God, being-itself, encompasses both potency and form.  The balance of dynamics within 
God is managed by the symbol of Spirit, which is the unity of the ontological elements.
21
  
The Spirit combines both the power of God, the abyssal potency of the Godhead, with the 
structure of the logos, the form of God.  In this sense, God is continually creating or 
actualizing God’s self.  The divine life is absolute creativity which stands out of absolute, 
oukontic, nonbeing.  In contrast, humanity participates to a degree in the divine 
creativity, actualizing some of humanity’s potentiality to be but also limited by 
humanity’s finitude.    Human life is finite creativity, attempting to actualize oneself out 
of one’s existence though humanity’s existence is often estranged from its essence.  
Human creativity stands out, exists, out of both the divine creativity and meontic 
nonbeing.  Human creativity and courage are grounded in the creativity and being of 
God.  The challenge for the theologian is to bring together limited human creativity and 
freedom into participation with the divine creativity and freedom of God.
22
 
Tillich offers an existentially charged rendering of the question of being.  Why is 
there something rather than nothing especially when this something is so often 
characterized by anxiety and estrangement?  The stakes of nothingness for Tillich are 
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 Ibid., 1:249. 
22
 This is the task of volume 2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, 3 vols. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957). 
  
10 
nothing other than creativity, the potential or power to be.  For God, this is the power of 
being-itself.  It is rooted in the potency of the Godhead and formed by the structure of the 
Logos and actualized in the Spirit.  God creates out of absolutely nothing (ouk on), which 
is to say that God creates using nothing other than the resources of God’s self.  Human 
creativity is rooted in the divine creativity, notably in the potential of meontic nonbeing, 
which is unactualized potentiality.  Human potential is enlivened in its anxiety by its 
encounter and recognition of meontic nonbeing, one’s ownmost potential of nonbeing, 
one’s being toward death.  The tragedy of humanity is the story of the Fall and 
humanity’s estrangement of its existence from its essence.  Too often humanity does not 
actualize, live up to, its own potential.  Yet this tragedy is countered by the possibility of 
courage and the new being of Christ.  
  
11 
ROBERT NEVILLE: FINITE/INFINITE CONTRAST 
Robert Neville has recently published his three part systematic philosophical 
theology, a culmination of a long and storied career.
23
  The structure mirrors that of 
Tillich’s systematic theology, an influence felt throughout the work.  This is not to say 
that Neville simply updates Tillich or merely follows in Tillich’s footsteps.  Many of 
Tillich’s driving questions and ideas similarly motivate Neville, notably the endeavor to 
understand ultimate concern through religious symbols and an existentially fueled search 
for an answer to the question of being.  Why is there something rather than nothing?  If 
Tillich characterized religion as a search for being-itself through primarily Christian 
symbols, Neville extends the scope of religion to the search for ultimacy that includes all 
religions. While Neville develops many of his theological goals in conjunction with 
Tillich, his philosophical oeuvre extends far afield of Tillich from Alfred North 
Whitehead’s philosophical cosmology to a focus on determinateness from Duns Scotus 
all of which is grounded in a realistic pragmatic form of inquiry in dialogue with the 
work of Charles Sanders Peirce.  Neville combines these many and disparate influences 
into a single, unifying hypothesis and definition of religion, which phrased succinctly is 
human engagement with ultimacy.
24
  In order to ground his theories of human 
engagement with ultimacy Neville produces a metaphysical hypothesis that describes 
ultimate reality.  This world is the product of a spontaneous ontological act of creativity 
that creates out of absolute nothingness.  One result of this hypothesis is a focus on the 
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 Neville, Ultimates. 
24
 Ibid., 4. 
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determinate world, i.e. this world in which human beings live and die.  The sheer making 
of the ontological act of creativity introduces novelty into existence.  Things are. There 
are new things.  Things are valuable, including human beings.  In other words, the 
hypothesis of an ontological act of creativity enables Neville to make value-full 
interpretations of the world.  This world is valuable in stark contrast to nothingness. 
Neville’s argument for the ontological act of creativity is his answer to the 
question of being.
25
  Why is there something rather than nothing?  Or as Neville says: 
“What does it mean to be, and why and how are there beings rather than nothing at all?”26  
Neville’s particular insight into the question of being is his approach.  He grounds his 
answer not in ontology but in philosophical cosmology, developing a cosmological 
description of determinateness from which to return to ontology.  Working from the 
context of determinate beings, Neville dialectically approaches the question of being 
from the problem of the one and the many.  What is the nature of being such that 
individual beings participate in being but are not being-itself?  Three aspects compile 
together into Neville’s definition of being.  Being is one for the many.  In this sense, 
being is a context of mutual relevance that allows individual determinate things to be 
related without the context needing a higher mutual field to relate itself to the determinate 
things.
27
  Being is univocal.  In other words, being has a unitary sense of meaning.
28
  
                                                        
25
 In some ways this is Neville’s answer to Heidegger for it is Heidegger that asks the question of 
being so poignantly.  Yet to claim that Neville is directly responding to Heidegger would be inaccurate.  
While being is a live question for Neville, it has little of the existential anxiety of Heidegger. 
26
 Neville, Ultimates, 169. 
27
 Ibid., 179. 
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Being is indeterminate.  If being is determinate, a thing, it cannot be the one for the many 
since it would need a higher context to mitigate the difference between itself and other 
things.
29
  Being understood as the one for the many is the indeterminate ontological 
context of mutual relevance.   
The indeterminate ontological context of mutual relevance is the ontological act 
of creativity, a move which Neville uses to ensure the indeterminateness of the 
ontological context of mutual relevance.  One can only approach indeterminateness from 
the perspective of determinate existence, from things.  Determinate things, working off of 
Duns Scotus’ notion of haecceity or thisness, are harmonies of essential and conditional 
components. Determinate existence and its harmonies are crucial for the interpretation of 
value identity.
30
  The ontological context of mutual relevance provides the unity for the 
differing essential and component harmonies of determinate things.  The challenge is to 
characterize the indeterminateness of the ontological context of mutual relevance.  Enter 
the ontological act of creativity, which is itself not determinate but the beginning of 
determinate harmonies.  Neville says: “The act is not something determinate over and 
above the things created.  Rather, it is a sheer making, the terminus of which is the world 
of determinate things together with just the kinds of connections, unities, and separations 
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that they have.”31 In other words, Neville develops a new doctrine of creatio ex nihilo: 
the ontological act of creativity, which is a sheer making or arising of the context of 
mutual relevance of determinate existence.  It is the breaking forth of something entirely 
new out of absolute nothingness.  The act creates the determinate harmonies required by 
essential and conditional components to be in terms of their determinacy while the act 
itself is the entire mutual field. In this sense, it is the power of being-itself as it is 
indeterminately for the many beings which participate in being.   
The import of the ontological act of creativity and absolute nothingness depends 
on the entrance of true novelty. Neville highlights the novelty of the act: “For the 
ontological act, there was nothing there before.  Everything is new.  This is the mark of 
the transition from complete indetermination, or nothing, to whatever determination 
exists in the world.”32  This introduction of novelty is an argument for the existential 
value of determinate existence as well as its radical contingency.  Individual beings 
actually add something new to Being.  In other words, determinate things are not 
privative being in contrast to Neo-Platonic notions of being.  The world is not some 
accident or less than existence that simply returns to the fullness of being.  Rather, 
existence matters and adds value to being-itself.  Human existence also matters for the 
sake of human creativity and the restructuring and valuing of harmonies.
33
  The 
                                                        
31
 Neville, Ultimates, 214. 
32
 Ibid., 217. 
33
 Ibid. 
  
15 
ontological act of creativity adds true novelty to the system, on the ontological and 
human scales, and eventually allows Neville to interpret the cosmos as value-full.  
What of nothingness for Neville?  The first place to look is the absolute 
nothingness that would prevail without the ontological act of creativity.  This absolute 
nothingness is an ouk ontic nothingness that serves to highlight the arbitrariness of the act 
of creativity.  Neville says: “The nothingness is the source of the ontological creative act, 
not in the sense of being the resource, the potential, but in the sense of being the starting 
point, the condition that would obtain without the act.”34  To say that the act creates out 
of nothing, creatio ex nihilo, does not mean the act draws its potential to be out of 
nothingness or out of the depths of its power to be.  There is no abyssal power of 
nothingness or within the act itself in contrast to the symbolic language of potency for 
Tillich within the divine life of the Godhead.
35
  The act is only intelligible from the 
standpoint of determinate existence apart from which there is no act.  Similarly, absolute 
nothingness also depends on its limited intelligibility from the standpoint of determinate 
existence and intelligibility.  Absolute nothingness is the counterfactual to determinate 
existence. 
The second place to look for nothingness is the finite/infinite contrast, which is a 
complimentary method of looking toward ultimacy alongside the ontological act of 
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creativity.  The finite/infinite contrast is one way to symbolically categorize the manner 
in which contrasted elements hang together.
36
  The finite side of the contrast refers to 
whatever finite or determinate thing is considered to be ultimate in a system of religious 
meaning.  It must be something finite about which definitive statements can be made.  
The infinite side gestures toward the indeterminate that would ‘be’ without the world-
defining finite side.  In this manner, the contrast allows for a symbolic reference point at 
the edge of intelligibility or to mark the boundary point of indeterminacy and 
determinacy.  The ontological act of creativity so far as it is construed as an act falls on 
the finite side of the contrast while the absolute nothingness that would exist were it not 
for the act falls on the infinite side.
37
  At its simplest, the finite/infinite contrast functions 
as a schema for the radical contingency of this world that stands out of nothingness.  It is 
a spotlight on the importance of the determinate and finite world.  The finite/infinite 
contrast throws itself in relief, standing out of the background of nothingness.
38
   
The third place to find nothingness for Neville is in the existential feeling of the 
counterfactual and the symbol of the mystical abyss.  Mystical language has long been 
apophatic in its attempts to describe the ultimate whether it is God for Pseudo-Dionysius, 
the Godhead beyond God for Meister Eckhart, the Not-Other for Nicholas of Cusa, the 
Abgrund for Jacob Boehme, or the Ground of Being for Tillich, as well as the various 
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symbols for many non-Christian mystical traditions.
39
  The mystical path uses a 
determinate symbol to refer to the indeterminate from the perspective of the radical 
contingency of this world.  The challenge for these mystical symbols is how to accurately 
and adequately engage the ontological act of creativity, i.e. to convey an existential 
feeling of the radical contingency of determinate existence.  This is the feeling of the 
counterfactual of what would pertain if the act never happened – its shock.  This is the 
feeling of nothingness.  Neville describes this feeling of nothingness as an embrace of the 
abyssal quality of the arbitrariness of life: “The arbitrariness, not of what is created but of 
the fact of creation itself, is meaningful only in a finite/infinite contrast with nothingness, 
albeit a counter-factual nothingness.  Therefore, the feeling of the contrast involves the 
feeling of non-being as well as being.”40  One exists on the pain of being nothing at all.  
Embracing the radical contingency of one’s existence entails embracing one’s life in the 
face of one’s death.  The foundation of the feeling of the counterfactual is the weight of 
the absolute nothingness, which is the counterfactual of determinate existence.  Yet the 
feeling gives rise to a feeling of nonbeing, which Neville offers as another series of 
contrasts, “the razor-sharp and infinitely dense contrast between being and non-being, life 
and death, joy and terror.”41  Might this feeling of non-being be a kind of meontic 
nothingness?   
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Meontic nothingness does not seem to be a deciding factor for Neville in contrast 
to Tillich. Neville might object to meontic nothingness on two levels.  First, meontic 
nothingness for Tillich presents possibility as a part of finite existence, the not yet of the 
power to be that is directly tied with the potency and the chaos of the Godhead.  
Possibility is an integral part of Neville’s analysis of determinate existence, but his 
mechanism for possibility contrasts with Tillich’s.  Determinate existence for Neville 
primarily entails existing in relation to other things – this not that – in contrast to existing 
out of nothingness.  Second, related to the differing mechanisms of possibility and 
potency, Neville’s analysis of temporality and eternity follows a radically different 
trajectory than Tillich or Heidegger, both of who are preoccupied with death.  Neville’s 
cosmology focuses on harmony and value not death.  It is the positive creation of real 
things rather than the anxiety of being nothing at all.  This difference is perhaps best seen 
in Neville’s movement from a feeling of nonbeing to a feeling of bliss, which transcends 
the contrast between life and death.
42
  The feeling of nonbeing is not a complete symbol 
for Neville unless it moves one from the mere shock of radical contingency to the 
positive embrace of this world.  But is there room to push Neville to have a sort of 
meontic nothingness?  Insofar as one incorporates the finite/infinite contrast into the 
depths of one’s being, one holds both the finite power to be and its counterfactual, 
absolute nothingness, together.  The appropriation of this sort of symbolic engagement is 
meontic.   
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For Neville ultimate reality, best understood as the ontological act of creativity, 
grounds a cosmos full of value. Everything that is real, that exists, is a harmony of 
essential and conditional components in contrast to the absolute nothingness that would 
pertain without the act.  The act is the creation of something entirely new without relation 
or dependence on anything that came before.  This newness adds to the valuation and 
meaningfulness of determinate existence.  The finite/infinite contrast is crucial to 
understanding the emergence of novelty, which came out of absolute nothingness or 
absolutely nothing. The finite/infinite contrast functions as a point of reference for 
ultimacy.  It throws together the specter of absolute nothingness out of which one stands 
in existence.   The existential feeling of nothingness can be understood as a meontic 
appropriation of finite, determinate existence in conjunction with absolute nothingness 
and one’s death.   
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RAY HART: MEONTOLOGY 
Ray Hart in his forthcoming God Being Nothing: Toward a Theogony develops a 
meontology, radicalizing the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo to say that God creates out of 
the nothingness of Godself, i.e. out of the nihility of the Godhead.
43
  He takes the 
language of abyss and grund and the workings of the divine life seen in Tillich to a 
radical, mystical conclusion following after the work of Meister Eckhart, Jacob Boehme, 
and Thomas J. J. Altizer.  Hart’s primary thesis is that God creates out of the nihil.  
Secondarily, God creates Godself out of the nothingness that is internal to the Godhead.  
Metaphysically, Hart’s discussion begins with Leibniz’s response to the ontological 
question. Why is there something rather than nothing?  Leibniz answers with the 
principle of sufficient reason.  There is nothing without a ground.  Hart, taking a tactic 
from Heidegger (though Heidegger perhaps does not go far enough with his own tactic of 
challenging the dominance of the language of Being), removes the ground and 
preeminence from Being.  God is not merely the ground of being or being itself.  Rather, 
Godhead is a groundless ground for determinate God, being, and nonbeing.  Existence is 
standing out of nothing: Leibniz’s is amazed that there is anything at all rather than 
nothing.  The being which stands out of nothing also goes toward nothing, which is the 
specter of death overhanging all being.  The nihil becomes preeminent for the 
indeterminate Godhead.  But does that lead to nihilism?  God fits into this mixture, so 
Hart claims, as God the determinate Creator-Redeemer who is the necessary but not 
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sufficient condition for there being something rather than nothing.  Yet, this God Creator-
Redeemer is “something of a metaphysical scandal.”44  In contrast, the Godhead, the 
abyss or ungrund that Hart adapts from Schelling and others in the Christian mystic 
tradition, is sufficient more than necessary in an alternative sort of metaphysical 
grounding of groundlessness in the determination process or meontoloigcally.  Hart 
claims that creation is both externally related to God and Godhead as well as internally, 
though not in the same sense as God is related internally to Godhead.  Theologically 
adding depth to the description of God and Godhead, Hart draws upon Boehme’s notion 
of turba, or a cosmic turbulence, which traces the indeterminacy that becomes 
determinate in God the Creator as well as the inner turbulence of the human soul.  Hart 
characterizes the abyss of Godhead as indeterminate desire and turbidity, which results 
(though temporal language like ‘results’ is misleading) in a restless fermentation that is 
internal to Godhead, a longing itself which moves from nothing to something and to 
nothing again, in the theogony of Godhead toward determinacy which is much like 
Boehme’s ‘mother of Being and Nothing’ and enfolds the totality of binary opposites of 
determinate and indeterminate into the abyss of Godhead.  In other words, Godhead is not 
merely indeterminate, an inert ineffableness or vast and empty nothingness like some 
caricatures of the vacuum of space.  Godhead is not merely the infinite side of Neville’s 
finite/infinite contrast nor is Godhead simply absolute nothing.  Rather, Godhead is a 
nihil that is full of potency – the potency to do otherwise or the potency of what is not 
established determinately yet.  It is a radicalization of Tillich’s language of abyss.  In this 
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sense, the language and movement of Nicholas of Cusa’s not-Other God is helpful, 
suggesting the limitless potential of the Godhead to be other than.  Godhead is a restless 
nihility, a groundless meontic nothingness.  
The potency of Godhead extends to the metaxic space between indeterminate 
Godhead and determinate God, which is the mixed space of both the advent and recusal 
of God from and back to Godhead.  Godhead becomes determinate in two distinct ways 
as Creator and as Redeemer.  God the Creator is linear, setting the finite world into being, 
creatio ab origine.  God the Redeemer comes into play with the re-creation, i.e. 
redemption, of the created world, creatio continua.  Hart succinctly states, “God the 
Redeemer is God freshly determinately taking account of what happens with and to His 
little ones.”45  God the Redeemer does so in advent and recusal, responding with new 
potency to the travails of humanity.  God the Redeemer does not meddle in the world, nor 
does God the Creator.  Rather, it is the absence of God that makes the metaphorical space 
for hope and redemption, the divine living and dying of God, the advent and recusal of 
God in order to replenish determinate God from indeterminate Godhead. It is a 
recuperation of indeterminacy for God’s reckoning redemptively with the freedom of the 
universe’s staying-out of God.  Godhead has not abandoned God and God has not 
abandoned creation toward the second not.   
The determination process that has guided Hart’s discussion of indeterminate 
Godhead and determinate God the Creator and God the Redeemer is itself a dynamic 
unfolding, a groundless ground in the middle between indeterminacy and determinacy.  
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Hart likens this process to Boehme’s use of Abgrund and Plato’s use of chora or what 
Hart calls “the abgrundlich nondeterminate.”46  It is a necessary ground and sufficient 
groundless, in Hart’s terms, in order to make sense of Godhead, God, and their internal 
intermediations.  God Being Nothing in which God is both being and nothing and the 
dynamic middle between the two occurs here in this choric abyss of the Abgrund in 
which God/Godhead is not Being and not Nothing, yet shelters determinate becoming 
nondeterminately.   
Humanity is also meontically configured.  Hart moves from theogony to 
anthropogony, the story of the birth of humanity.  Anthropogony is the rendering of the 
individual human, the soul, out of the fragility of its two nots, construed through three 
scenes of the individual person’s life: between the two nots, the consequent and 
impending; between factual actuality and essence or potency; and one’s renewal or 
redemption.  In other words, Hart seeks to build a theological anthropology out of the 
framework of nothingness, Godhead, and God.  Hart considers the turbidity, 
(un)becoming, and metaxic or mixed nature of the Godhead and God to be mirrored in 
creation.  This mirroring is fundamental for valuing finite existence.  Hart says: “But 
whether the nonbeing from which I come is the same as the not-being toward which I go 
is an inescapably stunning question of which the meaning of my temporal-temporary 
existence hangs, since if they are the same my existence itself seems to count only for 
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nought.”47  What does the becoming and unbecoming of each human individual mean for 
one’s self?   
Crucially, Hart explicitly names the first not, the original nothing out of which 
one stands, as a ‘nontemporal before-not’ and the second not, the one towards which I go, 
as a ‘temporal after-not.’48  Finite human existence in time matters for the second not.  
Human existence does not exhaust the potential of human essence.  How a person lives 
matters as well and not merely that one did exist.  Hart says: “My human life, as the unity 
of determinations over which I preside as the created elan of determinabilty, properly 
begins with the temporal funding, regrouping of my not: not God, not anyone or anything 
else in the cosmos, in short, my ownmost ad quem, my ownmost toward.”49  Human 
existence matters, one’s ownmost existence, and one has the potential to become 
something other than what is on mere existence.  One way to access this fund of potency 
is for the religious person to be reborn, a second birth, which Hart describes: 
The religious are they who center their redemptive being in the re-
litigation of the two pools of the not and in the invocative-evocative 
inversions between the ‘already’ indicative facticity of existence and the 
potencies of the temporally funded and imperative not-yet.  This involves 
nothing less than dying to the life which makes us merely other than (and 
thus negates) the first nought, the life which affirms itself merely as 
existing non-nought; and it involves nothing more than birth (commonly 
called rebirth) to a new life that is the negation of an existence correlated 
with an ungrounded second nought.  There is a first and a second coming 
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to be, as there is a first nought to come from and a second nought to come 
toward.
50
 
This process of rebirth, the second birth with which one negates the first not and by so 
doing, accesses the potency of the nihil in order to refund one’s potential to reform the 
second nothingness toward which one goes.  In other words, one dies and lives again.  As 
hinted throughout the text, the intellect qua imagination is the energy by which this 
renewal and redemption comes to fruition via a Christology informed by Meister 
Eckhart’s notion of the logos.  Human creatures creatively re-imagine the world and 
affect God, Godhead, and the second nothing toward which they go.  God self-generates 
God’s self out of the indeterminate, groundless abyssal potency of Godhead in which the 
interplay between one and many, Ungrund and Abgrund, and indeterminacy and 
nondeterminacy are equiprimordial.  It is from this potency of the Godhead that the 
actualization of determinate things spring, both determinate God Creator/Redeemer and 
creation.  The abyss of the Godhead holds mutually contradicting potencies of 
determinate ways of being, namely being and nothingness, the one and the many, 
freedom and necessity, and principle and principal.  Critically, Hart contends that each 
determinate thing is “the actualized determinate coincidence of opposing potencies; 
presiding over each is the logos of Heraclitus, as it is Logos of the gospels: Jesus on the 
Cross.”51  In other words, finite creation exists externally, stands out of, the God the 
Creator who in turn stands out of the internal interplay of the turbic and chaotic Godhead 
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with all of its potency.  This presiding notion, the logos, is rooted both in the Christian 
tradition, notably Eckhart’s use of the Latin verbum, and in western metaphysics, notably 
in the search for non-circular first principles and the later Heideggerian search for Being, 
which manifests or reveals itself rather than being proved.  This Eckhartian turn to the 
word, both verbum (word) and verum (truth), entails that the intellect is other than being, 
i.e. the intellect is nonbeing.  In fact, for Eckhart and Hart, it is nonbeing, the intellect 
that can be thought and not being as Parmenides thought.  If this is the case that Eckhart 
takes the opening of the Gospel of John seriously, then in the beginning, in principio, was 
the logos, the word, and the word as God – not being.  Hart says: “God the Father-Creator 
is the principal, the ‘by-which-it-is” (quo est) of anything that temporally is, and Eckhart 
never tires of saying that the first thing God creates is being; but God the Logos, 
principle, the ‘what-it-is’ (quod est) of anything temporally created as it virtually is.”52  
God the Creator creates all temporal creation, all determinate and finite things in the 
universe, and is the principal agent of its creation, as it is in terms of being or mere 
existence.  God the Logos creates temporal creation as it is virtually in terms of its 
essence and intellect, as it progresses imperatively toward its second nothingness.  These 
two modal categories of temporal creation, being and intellect, pave the way for Hart’s 
Christological rendering of humanity’s second birth and God the Redeemer’s second 
coming in relation to the nothingness toward which they go.  
 Even though the Eckhartian verbum remains indistinct in its application from 
Godhead to God to the individual, Hart does speak to the becoming and unbecoming at 
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work in the individual’s existence as well as its source of potency, which functions much 
like the refunding of potency for God out of Godhead.  Hart says: “Ours is always a crisis 
of e-mergence-y.  In this respect as in all others the human person traces what infuses and 
suffuses all determinate modalities of being, God not excepted, namely the indeterminate 
turba of indeterminate Godhead (the sacred, the holy).”53  One stands out of nothing, the 
first emergence, and goes toward nothing, all the time continually surprised by one’s own 
becoming and the re-creating and rendering of what one will be in one’s becoming and 
unbecoming.  In this sense, one is, like God, situated in a metaxic space of chora between 
the nots.  It is in going toward the second not that one stumbles upon different modes of 
being.  One is not merely existing, indicative being or that one is, but also the infinitive, 
the to be, and the imperative of essence and potential, what one will be.  
Much of the language so far has described the process of going toward the second 
not as one of becoming, but the process of unbecoming is as important if not more so as 
one goes toward the second not for Hart.  It is only through unbecoming ‘that I am’ does 
one create the metaphorical space to be other, to be reborn toward the second not.  In this 
sense, unbecoming comes to bear on one’s imperative being whereas becoming relates 
more to one’s indicative being.  Much like Creator God unbecomes into the nothingness 
of the Godhead and is so refreshed with potency to become the Redeemer God, humanity 
unbecomes in order to refund one’s potency, to be redeemed.  It is a willing toward the 
nothingness that one will become such that one becomes nothing and is reborn.  One is 
individuated as one that is determinately existent, standing out of the first not.  One’s 
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individuality is manifest when one embraces the second not, when the self/soul/spirit 
becomes one’s own.  That is, one turns inward to realize what one becomes and 
unbecomes toward the second not.  Hart draws upon Kierkegaard to emphasize this 
movement of realizing, becoming actual, through the incitement of human freedom.  One 
disposes oneself freely but one is also disposed, limited by necessity in the metaxic 
thrownness of dispositions of one’s own da-sein.  Hart clarifies: “To unbecome 
determinately what she is becoming and has become determinately is to will another 
negation, a negation of the self in favor of the ecstatic I, and to live that negation, to live 
oneself as nothing, a self-annihilating nothing.”54  This losing of the self brings one into 
the renewal of the potency of oneself so that one unbecomes “bearing only one’s 
ownmost deliberate determinateness into the second not (and that as one’s gift to the 
potency of its indeterminacy).”  This work of unbecoming is a ritual sacrifice, a willing 
and desiring to become nothing.  One becomes and unbecomes, willing to be nothing so 
that in one’s self-recusal one finds, or simply is found, the potency to be otherwise. 
Hart strives to work out a Christology that brings the turbic movement of Godhead to 
God Creator back to Godhead then to God Redeemer into the province of humanity.  Just 
as the potential possibilities of God Creator have ossified, so too does human possibility.  
The challenge is to refund human potentiality – to find redemption in the movement of 
the Godhead.  Driving this search for redemption is Hart’s desire to value human and all 
determinate and finite existence.  Determinate existence is bound by two nots or 
nothings.  The first not is the nothing from whence one comes, the creation out of nothing 
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or the original creation.  Existence stands out of an oukontic or absolute nothing.  The 
second not is the nothing towards which one goes.  This is the nothingness of one’s death.  
One’s existence goes toward a meontic nothingness, one’s ownmost possibility.  In order 
for human life to have value and meaning, the two nots must be different.  If the two nots 
are the same, as they are for Eckhart and similar Neo-Platonists, finite life stands out of 
and returns to God or Godhead with no appreciable difference made to God.  In other 
words, finite existence has no effect or meaning if it is merely a return.  If the second not 
is different, finite existence matters.  Hart’s meontology and theognoy, study of meontic 
nothingness and retelling of the birth of God, takes seriously the nihil of creatio ex nihilo 
as Hart casts the lives of Godhead, God, and creation in contrast to the bounds and 
potency of nothingness. 
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KEIJI NISHITANI: NOTHINGNESS AND EMPTINESS 
Keiji Nishitani in his seminal Religion and Nothingness uses the language of 
sunyata or emptiness in conjunction with nothingness to bring his interpretation of Zen 
Buddhism into dialogue with Meister Eckhart and Martin Heidegger.  He seeks to 
challenge modern existential nihilism, countering that everything is in fact nothing or 
empty, devoid of metaphysical commitments, so that one focuses on this world presently 
at hand.  The stakes are similar to those of Tillich, Neville, and Hart.  Nishitani wants to 
value this world in the face of nihility or “that which renders meaningless the meaning of 
life.”55  Nihility becomes problematic when it impinges one’s ability to find value or 
meaning in one’s life, such as illness or death.  Nihility is also closely related questions of 
existence, which are more personal versions of the question of being.  Nishitani asks: 
“Why have I been alive? Where did I come from and where am I going?  A void appears 
here that nothing in the world can fill; a gaping abyss opens at the very ground upon 
which one stands.  In the face of this abyss, not one of all the things that made up the 
stuff of life until then is of any use.”56  One exists on the pain of being nothing at all.  The 
recognition, what Nishitani calls realizing the real or appropriation, of this fundamental 
abyss of nihility at the base of existence is the starting place of religion and the first step 
toward valuing one’s life.57  Nihility, or the recognition of the nothingness at the base of 
existence, is the spur toward realizing or appropriating reality.  The challenge for 
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Nishitani is to tease out a definition of nothingness: an absolute nothingness as opposed 
to relative nothingness that allows for a groundless ground rather than simple nihilism.   
Nishitani describes broadly three Western ways of thinking about nothingness.  
First is the Christian tradition, using the notion of creatio ex nihilo to describe the manner 
in which God, “who transcends the nihility that forms the ground of the entities he 
creates,” is the fullness of being (the typical Neo-Platonic tradition).  Second is what 
Nishitani terms “atheistic existentialism,” which replaces God with nihility (e.g. 
Nietzsche and Sartre).  Third is Eckhart’s radical nothingness of the Godhead, which 
Nishitani thinks “must still be more profound than the nihility that contemporary 
existentialism has put in place of God.”58 Nishitani indicates that Eckhart’s absolute 
nothingness is indeed a more radical rendering of the nothingness of the Godhead than 
that offered by the Neo-Platonics.  Additionally, the absolute nothingness of the Godhead 
differs from the nihility of atheistic existentialism in the manner in which the Godhead 
takes the role of nihility, the self standing out of the godhead, but also negates being.
59
  
Absolute nothingness results when all modes of being are transcended into the 
ineffableness of the Godhead.
60
  The individual soul becomes one with the Godhead, 
entering into the ‘desert of the godhead,’ and losing all ground of the individual self into 
a type of field of nihility or the ‘bottomless ground’ of the godhead and out of which the 
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soul finds life.
61
  This entry is kenotic, a self-outpouring or emptying.  Nishitani further 
describes the nature of the pure oneness of the Godhead as pointing “to the sheer 
nonobjective character of this oneness” and an ‘absolute oneness.’62  In this manner, 
Eckhart’s absolute nothingness is a negative absolute nothingness in contradistinction to 
the Neo-Platonics or the atheistic existentialists.  Furthermore, absolute nothingness 
functions only in contrast to being, much like Neville’s finite/infinite contrast.  There is 
no thing as nothingness other than the nothing that stands behind the existence of a 
person.  There is no ‘is’ to the nothingness that is there.63  One lives out of a field of 
absolute nothingness, a sort of existential conversion, or what one might term an ultimate 
concern.  Nishitani describes the tension within absolute nothingness as “absolute 
nothingness-sive-being, being-sive-nothingess.”64   
Nishitani’s absolute nothingness, like Neville’s, is the counter-factual of 
existence, but Nishitani’s absolute nothingness also incorporates emptiness.  Absolute 
nothing is just that a no-thing and empty. Nishitani names this turn of absolute 
nothingness as “the field of sūnyatā or emptiness.”65  He further describes it as “an 
absolute emptiness, emptied even of the representation of emptiness.  And for that reason, 
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it is at bottom one with being, even as being is at bottom one with emptiness.”66  In this 
manner, the field of sūnyatā functions like the ontological context of mutual relevance, 
holding all things in relation but being empty of any specific thing.
67
  Crucially, Nishitani 
seeks to limit what one might call the reality of the field of sūnyatā, though this is a 
fraught task given the competing manner in which Neville and Nishitani use ‘reality.’  
Nishitani with this focus of emptiness is explicitly rejecting a Kantian distinction between 
phenomena and noumenal.  The supersensory world is not more real than the world 
before one of pure fact.
68
  The field of sūnyatā is there but only insofar as it makes sense 
of reality, accounting for the way things are in terms of their suchness, what Nishitani 
calls “the elemental mode of being,”69 and functions as the Zen Great Affirmation.70  In 
addition, Nishitani argues that the field of sūnyatā is a way to account for the problem of 
the one and many without making the same pitfalls as Plotinus and others in the Western 
tradition much in the same manner as Neville.
71
  He argues that traditional systems of 
philosophy discussed a unified One only in the sense of non-differentiation, but this 
merely reduces all things to the one.
72
  In contrast, if one starts from nothing, then 
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multiplicity and differentiation can have meaning.
73
  In this sense, Nishitani attempts to 
preserve the same meaning for creation that Neville does with his emphasis on novelty.  
The multiplicity and differentiation are in fact additions to absolute nothingness.   
MARTIN HEIDEGGER: BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH 
There is so much one could say about Martin Heidegger and the question of 
being.  At his simplest, Heidegger’s description of being-toward-death in his seminal 
Being and Time offers a way, a model, in which to categorize the existentially charged 
renderings of nothingness in Tillich, Neville, Hart, and Nishitani.
74
  Nothingness goads 
one toward valuing this world.  The specter of nothingness haunts descriptions of being, 
pushing from the underside against the power to be.  One must wrestle with question of 
being and the possibility – nay, the inevitability – of one’s death.   
In order to understand the importance of the End and Death for Heidegger, one 
must first understand how he arrives here.  From where does the analysis of the End 
originate? Asking this question keeps one in line with the hermeneutical structure of the 
text, the circling or spiraling around a point on the horizon, which is both an end goal and 
a starting point.  Heidegger has asked the forgotten question of Being, which already 
presupposes some understanding of Being.  Dasein, the focus of his investigation, is the 
being for whom Being matters, the being which knows being and yet does not know 
being, i.e. the forgetfulness of being.  Additionally, he has located the analysis of Dasein 
in terms of existence.  Heidegger says: “The essence of Dasein lies in its existence,” 
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which works out to an understanding of Dasein as a potentiality-for-being.
75
  Heidegger 
described phenomenologically in Division 1 the structure of Dasein, its everydayness and 
the phenomenon of care, particularly the primordial aspects of the structure of Dasein.  At 
the beginning of Division 2, Heidegger questions, if only rhetorically, the possibility of 
his primordial analysis.  Heidegger says:  
But have we not at the very outset of our Interpretation renounced the 
possibility of bringing Dasein into view as a whole?  Everydayness is 
precisely the Being which is ‘between’ birth and death.  And if existence 
is definitive for Dasein’s Being and if its essence is constituted in part by 
potentiality-for-Being, then, as long as Dasein exists, it must in each case, 
as such a potentiality, not yet be something. Any entity whose Essence is 
made up of existence, is essentially opposed to the possibility of our 
getting it in our grasp as an entity which is a whole.  Not only has the 
hermeneutical Situation hitherto given us no assurance of ‘having’ the 
whole entity: one may even question whether ontological Interpretation of 
Dasein will not founder on the kind of Being which belongs to the very 
entity we have taken as our theme.
76
  
In the fore-having and fore-sight of the primordial analysis, one must also have in sight 
the whole.
77
  Yet, the whole is problematic for Heidegger in view of the analysis of 
Dasein in terms of essence and existence notably in the way existence defies unity.  It is 
this exact impossibility of the possibility of Dasein’s existence, Dasein’s end, to which 
Heidegger will turn.  The way to make sense of the whole of Dasein’s existence is to 
extend the analysis to death.  Dasein as Being-in-the-world is also a Being towards death 
[Sein zum Tode].  Heidegger says, “The existential structure of such a Being proves to be 
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the ontologically constitutive state of Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being-a-whole.”78  In this 
sense, an analysis of the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein allows one to complete 
the whole analysis of Dasein and the struggle to authentically be in the phenomenon of 
care.  In other words, the specter of one’s death, i.e. that one might be nothing, challenges 
one to search for the meaning of one’s own being.  The meontic realization of one’s 
eventual death throws one toward a decision point – to value one’s existence or not. 
How exactly does a notion of Death, the End, enable one to analyze the whole?  
This is the overarching goal of Chapter 1 of Division 2, as Heidegger names it: “Dasein’s 
Possibility of Being-a-whole and Being-Towards-Death.”  Part of Heidegger’s answer 
lies in the circular manner in which he defines the essence of Dasein through the 
existence of Dasein.
79
  Heidegger says regarding the existence of Dasein: 
“Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a 
possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself.  Dasein has either chosen 
these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them 
already.  Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does 
so by taking hold or by neglecting.  The question of existence never gets 
straightened out except through existing itself.
80
 
Even in the early portions of Being and Time, Heidegger is prefiguring his analysis of 
Dasein.  Note here the manner in which Heidegger defines existence as possibility and 
grounds the question of existence in the process of existing.  What is the essence of 
existence?  What is the being of beings?  What does it mean to be?  These questions, for 
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Heidegger, are only answerable by one that exists, the Dasein, in contrast to Parmenides, 
Aristotle, and Aquinas all of whom asked the same question about the essence of 
existence.  The key for Heidegger is to understand the existence of Dasein as possibility 
[Möglichkeit].  Heidegger says: “It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that 
there is constantly something still to be settled [eine ständige Unabgeschlossenheit].  
Such a lack of totality signifies that there is something still outstanding in one’s 
potentiality-for-Being.”81  In this sense, Dasein as possibility is unfinished and is only 
finished when there is nothing left that is outstanding.  But at the point at which there is 
nothing left outstanding, Dasein no longer is.  Dasein ceases to exist when it runs out of 
possibilities.  Heidegger says: “As long as Dasein is as an entity, it has never reached its 
‘wholeness.’ But if it gains such ‘wholeness’, this gain becomes the utter loss of Being-
in-the-world.  In such a case, it can never again be experienced as an entity.”82  In other 
words, Dasein as a particular being runs up against the limits of its own existence and 
ceases to be a particular being.  Death is the end of the possibility for the particular being 
of Dasein and the way to speak of the wholeness of Dasein’s existence.  But the death of 
Dasein makes it impossible for Dasein to experience the wholeness of its own existence.  
How then can Dasein ever experience the possibility of wholeness?  Dasein potentially 
does so through the structure of care and the existential structure of Dasein, namely its 
own thrownmost possibility.
83
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Why does this model of being-toward-death matter?  In the grasping or 
appropriation of the meontic character of one’s finite being, there exists the potential to 
refund one’s potency to be in the world or at the very least a clearing or opportunity to 
value this world.  In this sense, the structure or movement of being-towards-death 
functions like the feeling of the finite/infinite contrast, throwing one toward the radical 
contingency of this world alongside absolute nothingness.  The meontic character of 
nothingness, the mixed and chaotic realization of nothingness on the edge of determinate 
being, enlivens one to the possibilities inherent in one’s (thr)ownmost potential to be. 
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NOTHINGINGESS: A HYPOTHESIS 
Nothingness matters for Tillich, Neville, Hart, Heidegger, Nishitani, and Eckhart.  
The terms they use to describe nothingness vary among them, but each brings it to the 
fore.  Why does nothingness matter, if at all, for these thinkers?  On one level, 
nothingness matters because it matters to their dialogue partners.  This is a family tree 
effect.  Each new growth builds upon the previous one: the heterodox valuing of 
nothingness to make sense of being.  On another level, nothingness matters for the 
manner in which it enlivens being.  The something of finite existence stands out of the 
emptiness of absolute nothingness.  Tied up with existence contra nothingness are the 
possibilities of existence or meontic nothingness.  At stake in the encounter with or 
exposure to nothingness is the ability to refund or redeem one’s ownmost potential and 
possibilities.  How one responds to the specter of nothingness makes nothing matter or 
not in the way one turns from nothingness back to existence.  In other words, the stakes 
are not merely the metaphysical (non)status of nothingness, but the desire to find 
meaning and value in human, finite existence in the face of radical contingency and the 
challenge of nihilism. 
Each of the theologians and philosophers discussed in this text begin their 
analysis of nothingness from the side of somethingness, i.e. they begin as existent, 
particular, determinate, finite beings whose Being matters for each of them.  This is their 
shared existential framework, a structure crystalized in Heidegger’s notion of being-
towards-death.  What does it mean to be?  In asking what it means to be, they also ask 
what does it mean to no longer be.  What does it mean to die, to end?  In more personal 
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terms, one can ask what does my life mean both here now and when I die?  Does my life 
have significant value and meaning? 
There is something surprising about the sheer fact of existence.  One finds oneself 
to be alive.  One also attempts to fill one’s life with meaning and value from the simplest 
of physical pleasures, such as the satisfaction of a good meal, to shared social values such 
as human rights or the beauty of music.  Yet there are many cases in which one’s search 
for meaning and value is disrupted whether by one’s own failures, natural events, or the 
actions of others.  One can see this tension between the fact of existence and the 
disrupted search for its meaning in the work of Meister Eckhart.  In his series of German 
sermons, Eckhart, relays the responses of a righteous man who explains why he values 
certain things.
84
  He values sleeping and eating because they give him strength.  He loves 
God, truth, and righteousness not for any special benefit but because they are worth 
loving for their own sakes.  God is worth valuing for God’s sake.  Life, in contrast, is 
valued because he likes living.  How can one like living when life is filled with so much 
suffering and pain?  In Heidegger’s terms, this is the challenge of living authentically in 
the world.  For Tillich, it is the anxiety that pushes against one’s courage to be.  It is the 
specter of nihilism.   
Life stands out of the nihil in two ways: ouk on and me on.  Ouk on, or absolute 
nothingness, is a non-dialectical nothingness that is utterly devoid of reference.  It is the 
radically other or infinite side of Neville’s finite-infinite contrast.  The sole way to 
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gesture toward it is in contrast to being from the perspective of a finite being who exists.  
In this sense, ouk on or absolute nothingness, defines the boundaries of Being as a relief 
or contrast.  Being is value-full in contrast to the emptiness of absolute nothingness.  
Being stands out of absolute nothingness – being-sive-nothingess.  Finite beings, 
however, participate in both being and nothingness.  Finite beings come from nothing and 
go toward nothing.  They are born.  They all eventually die.  This mixing of being and 
nothingness is dialectical nonbeing, the me on.  Hart distinguishes two the nothings that 
bound finite existence.  The first nothing out of which one exists is absolute nothing, the 
ouk on.  One’s being stands of out absolute nothingness.  One’s being goes toward a 
meontic nothingness as one’s ownmost possibility.  In this sense, the me on incorporates 
being, nothingness, and possibility.  The recognition of this meontic structure, of being-
towards-death, allows one an opportunity to respond.  In the unsettledness of one’s 
becoming as one goes toward the second not of existence, one must search for new 
potencies and possibilities for the manner in which one lives in the world.  One must 
unbecome toward the second nothing to refund one’s potencies and possibilities for living 
now.  
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